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Lucien BIANCO, La récidive, Révolution russe, révolution chinoise, Paris : Éditions
Gallimard, 2014, 517 p. 
1 The title of Lucien Bianco’s magnificent study is not easy to translate into English :
“The  Recurrence”  perhaps  (as  in  the  recurrence  of  a  disease  that  has  gone  into
remission) ;  or better,  “The Repeat Offence” (as in criminal recidivism). Pierre Nora
apparently  vetoed  Bianco’s  original  title :  “La  repetition,”  because  of  its theatrical
connotations (it can mean a “rehearsal”) ; and “La réplique,” a word that can mean an
“aftershock” as well as a “replica,” was also considered. This, too, was rejected since
aftershocks are always weaker than the initial earthquake.1 And this points us towards
the nub of Bianco’s argument. For against those on the left (especially in France) who
once argued that Maoism marked a profound break with Stalinism, Bianco contends
that Mao copied the Stalinist model, and that many of his supposed innovations were
no more than exaggerations of  features already present in the Stalinist  original.  In
other words, Maoism was essentially a repetition of Stalinism and one, moreover, that
in some ways was more destructive than the original. It is a bold, if not entirely original
thesis, and Bianco elaborates it with subtlety and sardonic verve.
2 As the doyen of historians of the Chinese Revolution, Bianco is fully alert to the ways in
which the nationalist character of that revolution distinguished it from the Bolshevik
revolution, with its more universalistic, class character. In comparison with his most
influential book, however, The Origins of the Chinese Revolution, which first appeared in
French in 1967 and in a fourth edition in 2007, La récidive places much less emphasis on
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the indigenous factors that gave rise to the Chinese Revolution, stressing instead its
essentially imitative dependence on the Soviet model.2 The core of his argument is that
both  revolutions  were  rooted  in  socio‑economic  backwardness  and  that  the
fundamental dynamic shaping their development was the determination on the part of
the Communist rulers to catch up with the capitalist world, no matter what the cost to
their  populations.  He  argues  that  for  Mao,  the  crucial  lesson  he  learned  from  the
Russian Revolution was the need to imitate Stalin’s “Great Break,” i.e. the decision in
1929  to  launch  crash  industrialization  and  violent  collectivization.  This  was  the
inspiration behind the Great Leap Forward (1958‑1960). In contrast to recent tendencies
to stress the determinacy of ideology, Bianco makes the case that it was the domestic
and international pressure to overcome economic and social backwardness that was
paramount in forging the similarities between the two regimes. While he does not deny
the efficacy of ideology, his is, essentially, a structural account. At the same time, he
tells us that though he was formed as a historian at a time when the Annales school was
pre‑eminent, he has always sought to preserve within himself the spirit of Plutarch.
And his book is indeed constantly attentive to the importance of revolutionary actors. 
3 The  book  comprises  nine  substantive  chapters  which  deal,  respectively,  with
backwardness,  “catching up” economically,  politics,  peasants,  famines,  bureaucracy,
culture, camps and “monsters.” As this suggests, the scope is wide, but there are areas
Bianco does not seek to cover. There is little about urban life or the working class (the
leading class in the eyes of both regimes) or – a point to which I shall refer below – the
Cultural Revolution. Given the theme of the book, moreover, we learn nothing about
how the practices and language of Stalinist politics were brought to China by Chinese
Communists trained in the Soviet Union before 1949 or by Soviet experts coming to the
PRC in the 1950s. Nevertheless the sweep of the comparison is impressive. In the first
two  chapters,  Bianco  shows  that  China  in  1949  was  far  more  backward
socio‑economically than Russia in 1917, and draws attention to differences as well as
similarities  in  patterns  of  socio‑economic development.  Urbanization  in  the  Soviet
Union, for example, advanced far more rapidly and spontaneously than in China. Both
regimes  improved  the  health  and  education  of  the  populace,  but  he  reckons  the
improvement  was  greater  in  Mao’s  China  than  Stalin’s  Soviet  Union.  Yet
notwithstanding the CCP’s more positive view of the peasantry, by the time Mao died in
1976,  the  average  income  of  rural  dwellers  was  scarcely  one‑third  that  of  urban
dwellers and possibly inferior to that of their grandparents. In the chapter on politics
Bianco  argues  that  Mao  was  basically  ignorant  of  marxism,  familiar  only  with  the
Stalinist style of politics. He scorns the idea that the mass line ever meant more than an
authoritarian  top‑down mobilization  of  the  masses.  Yet  he  gives  credit  to  Mao for
recognizing the possibility of a new state‑capitalist class coming to power through the
institutions of the party‑state. It is on this ruling class that the chapter on bureaucracy
focuses.  Bianco  stresses  the  accumulation  of  privileges  by  the  ruling  elite  in  both
societies, showing that Mao was far less tolerant of displays of privilege and material
comfort than his mentor, yet arguing that it was essentially the work‑style of the party
elite to which he objected, rather than its monopoly of power. 
4 Two outstanding chapters  on the  peasantry  and on famine follow.  Bianco tells  the
appalling story of Soviet collectivization well. Only the export of agricultural produce
could pay for rapid industrialization and it  was the need to extract more from the
peasantry that was the spur to forced collectivization in 1928. He makes the perceptive
point that Soviet collectivization was distinguished from its later Chinese counterpart
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by the simultaneous liquidation of private farms and the elimination of the kulaks as a
class. It was this that ensured collectivization in China was relatively non‑violent when
the “socialist high tide” of 1955 was proclaimed. True, this was a result in part of the
fact that the CCP had a far more detailed apparatus of rule in the countryside than had
the Bolsheviks in 1928, but the fact that “rich peasants” – much reduced in status by
land reform – were allowed to become members of the cooperatives meant that they
escaped  the  murder,  banishment  and  imprisonment  suffered  by  their  Russian
counterparts. In both countries collectivization was the prelude to a harrowing famine,
the  prime  causes  of  which  were  the  ruthless  pumping  of  resources  from  the
agricultural sector to support a reckless rate of industrial growth, exacerbated by the
ruthlessness  and ignorance  of  the  two dictators.  Bianco  follows  Andrea  Graziosi  in
suggesting that from autumn 1932 Stalin used famine to punish the Ukrainian people
for their nationalist insolence, which is by no means an uncontroversial view.3 It leads
to the debatable claim that Stalin’s responsibility for the famine sprang from intention
whereas Mao’s sprang from delusion. 
5 The chapter on culture, one of the longest in the book, is consistently interesting but
ultimately  unsatisfactory.  Bianco  wrestles  with  his  preference  for  Soviet  over  PRC
literature and he seems unwilling to concede that Soviet culture was never blighted to
the  same  extent  as  culture  under  Mao.  Despite  his  recognition  of  the  problem  of
evaluating writers in terms of whether they were supporters or critics of the regime, he
tends to articulate his analysis in terms of this principle. He thus cannot accept that a
writer such as Mikhail Sholokhov – a craven Stalinist or Soviet patriot, depending on
one’s point of view – can have been a great writer. More importantly, perhaps, the
limits of comparative method are most apparent when it comes to comparing writers,
for whom individuality is the defining characteristic. To compare Evgenii Zamiatin and
Shen Congwen, for example, by suggesting that both were writers who struggled to
keep their distance from politics, is to seize on a shared quality yet to overlook the
massive contrast in their genres and styles. 
6 By  contrast,  the  tightly  focused  chapter  on  the  camps  is  an  exemplary  piece  of
comparative history, admirably illuminating the similarities and differences between
the gulag and the laogai. Nearly 20 million Soviet citizens passed through the prison
system between 1929 and 1955 – perhaps one in six adults – and nearly 6 million others
were deported to distant regions. The proportion of those detained in China’s camps
and prisons was considerably smaller,  reaching a maximum of 1.75 per cent of  the
population in 1952 and 1.05 % in 1977. The camps in the PRC were smaller in size and
their  populations  more  stable.  The  social  profile  of  the  inmates  in  the  two  states,
moreover, was also different, with the proportion of peasants, foreigners and possibly
women (wives of “enemies of people”) greater in the Soviet Union. As Bianco grimly
demonstrates,  however,  the  central  experience  of  the  gulag  and  the  laogai  was  a
common one of hunger and poor hygiene (possibly worse in the laogai), with guards
equally corrupt but apparently more cruel in the gulag than the laogai. 
7 The  final  chapter  is  a  brilliant  comparison  of  Stalin  and  Mao  in  terms  of  their
personalities and modes of rule. Both dictators, according to the author, were cruel and
inflexible, inflicting untold suffering on their peoples ; both were cut off from society ;
both sought to make sense of the world and hankered to become major theoreticians.
Stalin  read  much,  assimilated  quickly,  and  had  considerable  knowledge  of  several
areas, whereas Mao was more narrowly Chinese in his intellectual formation – at the
Lucien Bianco, La récidive, Révolution russe, révolution chinoise
Cahiers du monde russe, 55/3-4 | 2014
3
age of sixteen he had never heard of the United States – and his educational handicap
increased with age, as he fell back for inspiration on the traditional classics. Bianco
then embarks upon what he calls “the impossible demonstration” : namely, an attempt
to judge which of the two “monsters” of the chapter title was worse. Given his central
thesis,  he concludes somewhat surprisingly that it  is  the ‘recidivist’  who comes out
better  from the comparison.  He points  out  that  a  greater  proportion of  the  Soviet
population fell  prey to the Great  Terror than did Chinese to Cultural  Revolution,  a
comparison that is still to the detriment of the Soviet Union even if 30 million Chinese
peasants who perished in the famine of 1969‑1961 are included. And whereas Stalin
unleashed the Great Terror after declaring that socialism had triumphed, Mao saw the
Cultural  Revolution  as  about  saving  the  revolution  (although  that  point  looks  less
telling  if  one  takes  into  account  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  Union was  threatened by
external enemies in 1937 in a way that China in 1966 was not).  Bianco’s argument,
however, rests ultimately on the motivations and modalities of rule of each tyrant. “On
the one hand, a premeditated massacre, rigorous, bureaucratic control, a meticulous
procedure launched and controlled by one man […] on the other, power at a distance,
overtaken by the cataclysm that it has unleashed and by the local initiatives for which
it is responsible but which it is incapable of mastering” (p. 426). This contrast between
ruination wrought wilfully and ruination wrought unintentionally is by no means clear,
in my view. Some would argue that the Great Terror quickly ran out of Stalin’s control,
while  others  would  point  out  that  Mao  regularly  set  quotas  for  the  percentage  of
“counter‑revolutionaries” to be arrested or put to death, long after the real danger of
counter‑revolution  had  receded.  And  it  is  stretching  things  to  suggest  that  Mao’s
responsibility for the famine sprang from “folly”, whereas Stalin’s sprang from intent.
Bianco does in fact mention that if Mao had not launched a “second leap” in summer
1959 – following his fury at Peng Dehuai’s daring to criticise the Great Leap – two thirds
of the famine victims might have been saved. And he concedes that Mao was “pushing
things  towards  the abyss”  (p. 169).  So  it  is  hard  to  acquit  him  of  a  degree  of
intentionality (what Thomas Bernstein calls “wilfulness”) in respect of the famine.4 And
whilst Bianco is correct to say that Stalin’s cruelty was more meticulous and vigilant
than Mao’s, it is doubtful whether any metric for measuring evil can be constructed
that will prove to general satisfaction that Mao’s cold indifference to the consequences
of  his  actions was less  morally culpable than Stalin’s  cold calculation.  So while  the
comparison is a real tour de force,  it is not clear that seeking to decide who was the
worse “monster” is ultimately illuminating.
8 Throughout the book, Bianco, an expert on China, displays a strong command of the
historiography of the Stalin era in English and French.5 This historiography, based on
deep archival research, is much more extensive than the corresponding historiography
of the PRC. Nevertheless, there is a nascent, archivally‑based historiography of the PRC,
of which Bianco makes surprisingly little use, except in relation to the famine. This
matters because the archives allow us to compare in a way that was impossible until
recently the impact of the two revolutions on the lives of ordinary people. Archival
sources allow us to explore the two revolutions “from the bottom up” ; and from that
perspective differences start to appear as significant as similarities. To make just two
very general points. First, the distinctive facets of Maoist ideology had a purchase on
grass‑roots  politics  that  made  the  Chinese  revolution  very  different  for  its  Soviet
counterpart.  If  recent Soviet historiography has tended to highlight once unnoticed
aspects  of  Stalinism that  appear  to  adumbrate  Maoism –  one thinks  of  the regular
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recourse to campaigns or the rituals of criticism and self‑criticism within the party –
there was nothing similar  in the Soviet  Union to the ways in which Mao’s  shifting
thought translated into the politics of everyday life. Following his speech on handling
contradiction of  February 1957,  for  example,  a  new round of  struggle  sessions  and
writing of personal histories was launched in workplaces around the country with a
view to identifying antagonistic and non‑antagonistic contradictions in the workforce.
Similarly, in the mid‑1960s, the exalted status of Mao Zedong Thought led to hundreds
of  thousands  of  educated  youngsters  being  sent  into  villages  to  teach  peasants  to
memorize  Mao’s  “three  constantly  read  articles,”  which  dealt,  respectively,  with
serving  the  people,  communist  internationalism,  and  perseverance  in  the  face  of
hardship.  In  the  Soviet  Union,  of  course,  there  was  mass  propaganda  aplenty,  but
nothing akin to such sustained and massively resourced campaigns aimed at reworking
the beliefs and values of ordinary people in accordance with the shifting ideology of the
Great Helmsman. If ideology was far more invasive of daily life in China than the Soviet
Union, new archival sources also attune us to the ways in which indigenous cultural
practices  shaped official  policy  and popular  response to  those  policies.  When work
teams were sent into villages to carry out land reform, for instance, they promoted the
technique  of  “speaking  bitterness,”  selecting  poor  peasants  to  pour  out  their
grievances and denounce their “exploiters” in the new language of class. In 1947 in one
district of Huanghua county in Hebei province, 323 peasants spoke of how they had
starved in the “old society” ; 546 told of how they had begged for food ; 115 of how they
had  been  forced  to  sell  sons  and  daughters ;  42  of  how  their  families  had  been
dispersed ; 116 of relatives who had been killed by bandits. This venting of suffering
was suffused with extremes of  emotion.  The local  party  organisation reported that
among  5184  peasants  who  performed  “speaking  bitterness,”  4451  cried  bitterly,  12
cried until they fainted, 195 cried until they vomited.6 This theatricalization of politics
was at the heart of all Maoist campaigns and it drew on the manichean story lines of
much  popular  culture.  In  the  public  trials  that  accompanied  the  campaign  against
counter‑revolutionaries in 1950‑1951, the accused were assigned roles akin to those of
sinister  characters  in  folk  opera  and  their  crimes  were  narrated  according  to  the
conventions of that genre. On 20 May 1951, Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing, addressed
a  crowd  of  tens  of  thousands  who  had  turned  up  for  the  trial  of  220
counter‑revolutionaries : “What shall we do with this bestial group of vicious despots,
bandits, traitors, and special agents ?,” he railed. “Shoot them !” the audience yelled.7
The show trials of 1936‑37 in the Soviet Union were certainly orchestrated to theatrical
effect, yet there was nothing akin to the participation of the masses in the drama or to
the  manipulation  of  folk  genre  to  elicit  emotional  identification  on  the  part  of
spectators. While we should certainly not assume that the Maoist state had the capacity
to  achieve  its  ends,  its  inventiveness  in  devising  forms  through  which  it  could
disseminate  its  ideological  categories,  its  systems  of classification,  its  discursive
practices, its norms and values had no antecedent in Stalinism. 
9 It  is  in the inattention to the Cultural  Revolution,  however,  that  one feels  Bianco’s
thesis of recidivism most obviously fails to register the differences between the two
revolutions.  The Cultural Revolution is discussed only as a comparator to the Great
Terror, and that discussion only takes up fourteen pages. Yet western scholars now
tend to concur with their PRC colleagues in seeing the Cultural Revolution as lasting an
entire decade, from 1966 to 1976. As a political crisis engineered by the supreme leader
through the mobilization of Red Guards and rebel workers, a mobilization that quickly
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imperilled the regime over which he presided, the Cultural Revolution had no analogue
in  any  other  Communist  state.  So  one  might  argue  that  to  exclude  it  from  the
comparison with the Soviet Union is legitimate. Yet if  one is seeking to understand
what the Maoist revolution meant for hundreds of millions of people, then the Cultural
Revolution  was  a  defining  experience.  The  mass  movement  to  assault  “those  in
authority taking the capitalist  road” rapidly degenerated into violence, factionalism
and chaos  that  deeply  affected popular  understandings  of  what  the  revolution was
about. Not a state office, party organ, high school, university, factory or shop remained
untouched, and even in the countryside the impact was much greater than was once
thought, especially in county towns. In the Soviet Union there was nothing similar to
the “wild beatings and wild killings” that tore local communities apart during 1967 and
1968, despite the violence of the civil  war and collectivization, (indeed many Soviet
citizens supported Stalin precisely because they saw him as the guarantor of  social
order). The Cultural Revolution thus reminds us that an indispensable element in any
comparison between the two revolutions must encompass social history, must explore
the differential impact of the revolution on the mass of the population. 
10 Bianco’s focus on the structural dynamics and top‑down policies of the two regimes
makes for a cogent case that, in formal terms, the revolutions were broadly similar. The
emphasis  on  form,  however,  comes  at  the  expense  of  attention  to  ideological  and
socio‑cultural content ; and once one starts to look “from the bottom up” at how the
revolutions  worked  themselves  out  in  the  daily  lives  of  ordinary  people,  then
differences loom large. This criticism, however, is a response to the thought‑provoking
character of Bianco’s argument and is not intended to detract from his extraordinary
achievement. He has written a wise and humane book, one attuned to the ironies of
revolution, a testament to a lifetime of study and reflection.
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